

# **The EU in conflict prevention and civil-military crisis management – the quest for effectiveness and legitimacy**

## **Final Expert Seminar**

in the framework of the project

“The EU as a Global Player – Strengths and Weaknesses of the CFSP and ESDP as  
seen from an Italian-German Angle”

## **Draft Background Paper/ Session I**

### **CFSP in conflict prevention and crisis diplomacy - some observations and assumptions**

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*“Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this. Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners.”<sup>1</sup>*

The above extract from one of the most recent basic documents of the EU-27 gives quite an adequate picture of both the achievements and limitations of the CFSP of today. It reflects a clear “we can do” attitude of those involved in the daily business. As cumbersome as ESDP missions may be - and the one in Kosovo is a case in point here - insiders wish to underline the importance of such a decision to foster intra-EU institutional cooperation and moves towards a more comprehensive approach to external challenges. Seen from an outside

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<sup>1</sup> Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World . 11 December 2008.Doc. S407/08

academic perspective the focus tends to be more on the real or perceived CFSP failures<sup>2</sup> but also there the progress made is increasingly acknowledged.

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<b>Legal instruments introduced by TE</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
Joint actions (including implementation decisions)	20	42	61	66
Common positions (including implementation decisions)	20	29	30	33
Agreements with third countries (art. 24 TEU)	16	15	2	13
Other Council decisions related to CFSP	13	10	3	7
<b>Traditional instruments</b>				
Declarations	150	153	112	169
Demarches	606	292	546	x <sup>3</sup>
Political Dialogue	228	134	343	x <sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Emma J. Stewart: Assessing the costs of EU hesitancy in Georgia, in: CFSP Forum vol.6, no.5/ 2008, pp.1-4.

<sup>3</sup> Data for 2008 not yet available

<sup>4</sup> Data for 2008 not yet available

## **Instruments: growth and differentiation in quantity and quality**

Despite the well-known failures to speak with one voice, the CFSP policy output is impressive both in terms of quantity (breadth of agenda) and quality (differentiation according to substance and instruments).<sup>5</sup> While EPC, the precursor of CFSP, fell short of instruments other than traditional diplomacy (such as declarations, demarches, Presidency fact-finding missions), CFSP added a set of legal instruments (common strategies, common positions, joint actions) which can take ambitious forms such as the EU's civil and military crisis management operations. The latter<sup>6</sup> require enormous capabilities in terms of technical equipment, personnel and money and adequate structures for planning and implementing the operations.<sup>7</sup> Though the EU is still far from closing the 'expectations-capability gap',<sup>8</sup> progress has been achieved since 2003 in a trial and error process which has not been tension-free.

The progress achieved in ESDP with the 'speed of light' – as the High Representative for the CFSP puts it frequently – reflects itself also in the use of the CFSP instruments and in particular those established with the TEU. The growth of CFSP joint actions is largely due to the ever growing number of crisis management operations carried out since 2003<sup>9</sup> and the need to establish new structures expresses itself in the numerous institutional decisions of the Council and the PSC. Similarly the more frequent use of agreements with third countries has to do both with the growing interest of non-EU member states to participate in ESDP missions and the EU's need to profit from resources EU member states cannot sufficiently deliver.

The instrument of common positions is also frequently used to define the EU's approach towards third countries or regions outside the immediate neighbourhood, such as the ACP countries, while joint actions usually address relations with the Balkans, the Middle East and more recently Central Asia and the South Caucasian region. The former are also applied in case of sanctions, while the mandates of the Special Representatives – another successful approach to be more operational and present on the ground – are defined through joint actions.

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<sup>5</sup> For further details see the annual compilation done by the Council Secretariat 'Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, Doc. 10665/09 PESC 735 FIN 206 PE 214.

<sup>6</sup> As for first assessments see among others: Nowak 2006; Ehrhart, H.-G., 'EUFOR RD Congo: a preliminary assessment', *European Security Review*, no.32 (Brussels: 2007); Gourlay, C. et al., *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, Chaillot Paper no. 90* (Paris: EU ISS, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> Howorth, J., 'From Security to Defence: the Evolution of the CFSP', Hill, C. and Smith, M. (eds), *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: University Press, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> Notion introduced by: Hill, C., 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', Bulmer, S. and Scott, A., (eds), *Economic and Political Integration in Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).

<sup>9</sup> For further details see also the other background paper .

All these activities have financial implications and as such clearly differ from the old and 'cheaper' EPC instruments. The financing of the CFSP<sup>10</sup> caused severe controversies between diplomats and Community bodies and in particular the European Parliament since the latter tried to improve its competences inside CFSP through its rights as part of the budgetary authority in the EC. It seems as if there is a mutual learning process taking place on either side with regular – at least five gatherings a year - consultation meetings between the EP and the presidency. Beyond the budgetary sphere relations between the CFSP actors and the MEPs have intensified not only in terms of quantity over the past years – as the frequent appearances of presidency representatives, the Special Representatives and Solana and his staff suggest<sup>11</sup> - but also in quality as Council insiders wish to underline.

Another source of tensions between the Council and European Commission arose from the fact that CFSP expenditure fell constantly short of the policies pursued.<sup>12</sup> Consequently CFSP still has to seek additional funding from other sources of the Community budget which, however, are in the hands of the Commission.

Among the more 'traditional' instruments of collective foreign policy-making declarations continue to be at least an additional tool to express the views of the EU-27 on a particular issue. Despite the harsh and often unjustified criticism of 'mere' declaratory policy, reactions from third parties indicate that even words may have a significance in foreign policy. More than before CFSP declarations today often contain a 'conditionality clause' as normally do the treaties the EU concludes with third countries i.e. in case the addressee aligns with the policy of the EU-27 it may profit from specific EU support (aid, trade concessions, etc) or lose it in case of deviation.

Interventions against the violation of human rights<sup>13</sup> are usually high on the CFSP agenda. They can take very different forms and it seems that the instrument of the diplomatic - and by its nature confidential – demarche has lost importance while meetings in the framework of political dialogues are used more intensively. This holds true for the specific human rights dialogues the EU has established with China, Iran, Russia and most recently with the countries in Central Asia. Also in gatherings between the EU and third countries or regional groupings human rights questions have been addressed more often.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The funding of CFSP measures having military or defence implications is excluded from the Community budget (art. 28 TEU) and depends on national contributions.

<sup>11</sup> See the detailed overviews in: Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, Doc. 10665/09 PESC 735 FIN 206 PE 214.

<sup>12</sup> In 2005 the CFSP budget was only around €62 million. Even though for the period 2007-13 a rise from €150 to 340 million is foreseen, not least because of the insistence of the High Representative, CFSP expenditure makes but 2.3 % of the overall EU budget for EU external action. Bendiek, A., The financing of the CFSP/ESDP: "There is a democratic deficit problem", *CFSP Forum*, vol. 6, no. 4, 2006. Smith, K, *European Union Foreign Policy in a changing world*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cambridge: Polity Press 2008), p.60.

<sup>13</sup> More information is available through the annual Council reports on the human rights situation.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, during the 2007 German Presidency the ministerial meeting between the EU and ASEAN concerning the issue of Burma.

More generally political dialogues have served the EU well to 'export' its own successful model of integration to other parts of the world (ASEAN; Gulf Cooperation Council) and through them the EU has offered its services as a mediator and partner (as in Central and Latin America, or the Barcelona process). Since this instrument requires excessive preparation inside the EU and involves a great number of participants in case meetings take place in full format (EU-27) cautious adaptations have been made to 'economise/ rationalize' the dialogues: to reduce the number of participants (Troika; High Representative), to streamline the agenda, or even to reduce the number of meetings have been considered as appropriate even though the latter approach tends to be interpreted by the other side as a loss in importance and a qualitative change in the relationship. Shifts in the traditional "ranking" as a dialogue partner was perhaps most directly felt by leaders in Latin and Central America when EU enlargement drew greater EU attention to its new bordering countries in the south and the east. Apart from and in addition to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) the Eastern Partnership inaugurated under the Czech Presidency in May 2009 is designed to set up a new multilateral framework with regular meetings at both top political and administrative levels<sup>15</sup> which is said to be full of dynamism at the moment but which showed right from the beginning typical shortcomings of the EU performance in political dialogues. Similarly the French driven project of a Union for the Mediterranean complementing the already existing Euromed partnership<sup>16</sup> creates enormous EU internal institutional complexity not necessarily welcomed by all of France's EU partners.

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<sup>15</sup> Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 7 May 2009.

<sup>16</sup> See among others: S. Stavridis: The Barcelona process, twelve years on: A critical overview, *Agora Without Frontiers* vol. 13 (4) 2008, pp. 243-261.

	1970	1986	1993	1996	1999	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2010 <sup>17</sup>
<b>Heads of State/ European Council</b>													
<b>President/ European Council</b>													
<b>Foreign Ministers (until 1993; from 1989 onwards meetings on fringe of) Council External Relations</b>													
<b>Foreign + Defence Ministers/ Council External Relations</b>													
<b>Defence Ministers (informal)</b>													
<b>Steering Board EDA (Defence Ministers + others)</b>													
<b>Political Committee (PoCo)</b>													
<b>Political and Security Committee (PSC/ COPS)</b>													
<b>Expert groups/Council working parties</b>													
<b>European Correspondents</b>													
<b>Relax Counsellors</b>													
<b>Nikolaidis Group</b>													
<b>High Representative for the CFSP</b>													
<b>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</b>													
<b>European External Action Service</b>													
<b>Policy Unit</b>													
<b>Secretariat (Council)<sup>18</sup> CPCC/ CMPD</b>													
<b>Special Representatives</b>													
<b>Personal Representatives</b>													
<b>EU Military Committee</b>													
<b>EU Military Staff<sup>19</sup></b>													
<b>Civil Crisismanagement Committee</b>													
<b>European Defence Agency</b>													

<sup>17</sup> Provided Lisbon Treaty comes into force.

<sup>18</sup> In the 1980s a 'flying' secretariat existed. From 1986 to 1993 the secretariat was a completely separate 'unit' with a 'head' inside the Council Secretariat. From 1993 onwards, it was integrated into DG E of the Council Secretariat. Today the secretariat includes also a Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) and a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Further reconstruction of various DGs is underway to create also a new Civilian-Military Strategic Planning Directorate. See: Presidency Conclusions, European Council 11/12 December 2008 Doc. 17271/1/08 REV 1.

<sup>19</sup> Includes also the Civil-Military Cell to support autonomous ESDP missions.

## **Institutional growth and differentiation**

Apart from the (legal) foundations the institutional set-up is key to understand the EPC/CFSP as a dynamic and irreversible process. Since EPC/ CFSP issues are by nature the domain of the foreign ministers and their diplomatic staffs, they have always been the key players. However, their numbers and the frequency of the meetings of today have nothing more in common with those of the 1970s and 1980s and even throughout the CFSP of the 1990s the growth of actors continued.<sup>20</sup>

Similarly the 'environment' in which CFSP decisions are prepared and implemented differs from former practices and has implications for the behavioral patterns of those involved.

### ***'Institutionalisation'<sup>21</sup> and 'Brusselisation'<sup>22</sup>***

As is obvious from the table above the institutional set-up has been enlarged considerably. The rather selective agenda of EPC – the Middle East conflict and the CSCE (today's OSCE) were among the first topics – steadily grew as a result of successful European concertation. The inclusion of foreign policy experts from the national capitals turned out to be vital for the preparations of the ministerial meetings and those of the Political Committee. Apart from new regional and functional topics, security and defence issues gained ground from 1999 and were further accentuated from 2003 with the start of the civilian and military crisis management operations. Furthermore both the legalisation of CFSP decisions and the recourse to Community instruments and finances made it necessary to install specific coordination mechanisms such as the group of Relex Counsellors.

At the top administrative level, the Political Directors, fundamental changes have taken place. Institutional differentiation followed from the constant overload of the Political Committee and led to the creation of today's Political and Security Committee (PSC) – a new actor designed to be subordinate to the Political Committee in terms of bureaucratic hierarchy but which evolved to the central body in daily CFSP business. In contrast to previous practice when the Political Committee met only once a month or even less in the 1970s, the PSC ambassadors gather twice a week and if necessary more often. What had been unthinkable in EPC days became real from 2000 onwards: not only do PSC meetings take place in Brussels but PSC members are located within the member states' representations to the EU. This applies also to the CFSP levels below such as the relatively recent Nikolaidis group whose main task is to prepare the PSC meetings or the Relex Counsellors responsible for the legal aspects of CFSP decisions and their implications for Community issues.

This trend towards the 'Brusselisation' of traditionally capital-based CFSP actors is visible inside the Council framework. The most 'revolutionary' change was probably

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<sup>20</sup> For an overview, see Duke, S. and Vanhoonacker, S., Administrative Governance in the CFSP: Development and Practice: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, no.11, 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Smith, M. E. , *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*. 2003.

<sup>22</sup> Among the first: Allen, D. Who speaks for Europe?, Petersen, J. and Sjusen, H., (eds) , *A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? Competing Visions of CFSP* (Routledge: 1997).

at ministerial level, when the Council of External Relations (an EC organ) became the main CFSP decision-making body. While EPC was marked by the famous and rather inefficient travelling circus of the foreign ministers, from the 1990s they met at the EC sites (Brussels and Luxembourg). The force of events – a credible EU foreign policy calls for a comprehensive interpillar approach – worked in favour of a more unitary institutional set-up. Not surprisingly this process was not tension-free. PSC ambassadors had to find their role vis-à-vis the other body traditionally in charge for the preparations of the Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper).

Commission participation in ESDP-related bodies such as the EU Military Committee raised concern among the governments and competition was strong in areas of overlapping competences such as civilian crisis management. Suspicions were and are strong inside Community circles that the intergovernmental CFSP might interfere with the supranational arena. ‘Theological’ debates promote separation instead of cooperation and coordination. And it seems as if the recent ruling of the European Court of Justice<sup>23</sup> favoring the Commission competences in the area of external relations has strengthened such tendencies which become obvious in the sometimes difficult drafting of joint Council/ Commission reports on CFSP affairs or in the attempts to improve the external representation of the EU through “double hatted” Heads of the Commission delegations, insiders argue.

This lack of ‘institutional consistency’<sup>24</sup> slowed down EU decision-making and multiplied the ‘voices’ speaking on the EU’s behalf. The creation of the post of a High Representative for the CFSP in 1999 raised considerable concern on the part of the Commissioner for External Relations. Similarly the Policy Unit<sup>25</sup> met with reservations from Commission circles but even inside CFSP and in particular in the Directorate General E of the Council Secretariat suspicions about the ‘newcomers’ existed. Furthermore the numerous Special Representatives<sup>26</sup> worked largely separately from the Commission delegations in third countries. The appointment of E. Fouéré as both Special Representative of the EU to Macedonia and another “double-hatted” EU Special Representative appointed in late 2007 to address the EU’s interests towards the African Union might serve as a model to reduce these frictions. Other proposals<sup>27</sup> suggest more intense communication and regular meetings between first and second pillar actors at both political and administrative level but real progress must probably await the fusion of the posts of High Representative for the CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations.

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<sup>23</sup> See the ECJ ruling RS C – 91/05, 20 May 2008 ( Ecowacs/ small weapons).

<sup>24</sup> Nuttall, S. Coherence and Consistency, Hill, C. and Smith, M., (eds), *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: University Press, 2005).

<sup>25</sup> Its official name in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty – Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit - is no longer used since it does not correspond to its factual role.

<sup>26</sup> G.Grevi: *Pioneering foreign policy. The EU Special Representatives*, Chaillot Paper Nr.106, (Paris: 2007).

<sup>27</sup> European Commission, *Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility*, COM (2006) 278 final; Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 15/16 June 2006, Doc. 10633/06 CONCL 2.

### **‘Socialisation’**

As is well-known the guiding principle for decision-making in both EPC and CFSP has been the consensus rule. Majority voting, though applicable since the Amsterdam Treaty in very rare cases, has remained only on paper. CFSP practitioners argue that the nature and sensitivity of CFSP issues require an atmosphere of negotiations in which each participant is taken on board instead of being excluded and outvoted. The key factor which facilitates consensus building and concrete policy outcomes even in such a large group as the EU-27 has to do with specific behavioural patterns of the participants, the ‘concertation reflex’ or ‘socialisation’. What was a novelty in the days of EPC is normalcy today: taking the views of other partners into account before defining one’s own position has become ‘a naturally done thing’ according to insiders.<sup>28</sup> The high degree of institutionalisation and Brusselisation has reinforced this trend of ‘Europeanising’ national foreign policies. The work of the Council Secretariat and the increasingly political functions of the Policy Unit plus the successful performance of the High Representative have also promoted the emergence of an *acquis politique* which is far more than the lowest common denominator. Admittedly history has shown us that socialisation does not work 100 per cent of the time. When the question of peace or war arises and transatlantic relations are at stake, or in situations when issues are already highly politicised at the national level, CFSP decisions are difficult if not impossible to be achieved. In this regard both the issue of the Georgian- Russian crisis and Kosovo are said to have worked towards greater cohesion in the end despite diverging interests and confusing national behaviors, according to CFSP participants.

### **The Lisbon Treaty – a new complexity in institutions and instruments**

As previous reform debates the latest one leading to the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007 was driven by the need of the EU-27 to improve the visibility, continuity, efficiency and coherence of the CFSP. Among the major novelties are: the end of the rotating presidency at both the level of the Council of Foreign Affairs and the Political and Security Committee (PSC), to be replaced by one single “face”, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and supporting staff, i.e. the European External Action Service. In the area of security and defense the contracting parties commit themselves to wide - ranging collective actions of both a military and civilian character: from disarmament and military advice tasks to combat forces in crisis management including peace - keeping and post – conflict stabilisation.<sup>29</sup> Besides, some new modes of flexibility are offered for the future “common” security and defense policy.” Despite this intended (?) change in the name of the former ESDP it will not be communitarised but will remain intergovernmental and strictly consensus – based.<sup>30</sup> The new provisions open some ways for differentiation for those “able and willing” states among the 27 who wish to advance and to take over more responsibilities in the name of Europe. The formats may vary and range from individual actions of a group of states which are entrusted

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<sup>28</sup> Juncos, A. and Pomorska, K., *Playing the Brussels Game: Strategic Socialisation in the CFSP Council Working Groups*, *European Online Papers*, vol. 10, 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Art.28b/ 43 Lisbon Treaty/ TEU.

<sup>30</sup> Except for decisions to initiate permanent structured cooperation according to Art. 28a/ 46 Lisbon Treaty/ TEU.

by the Council to implement a specific mission to more longer-term projects within permanent structured cooperation which require high military capabilities.<sup>31</sup>

No doubt, what has been achieved in late 2007 is impressive and widely reflects the substance of the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. However, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty today appear in a different context after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and after new precisions and additions were inserted during the 2007 negotiations.<sup>32</sup>

Optimists argue that those changes are nothing but a response to the concerns of those governments who wished to eliminate all connotations of a European statehood and do not alter the substance of the earlier text. Related to the CFSP chapter the alterations and additional precisions mean in particular the omission of the notion of a Union Foreign Minister, the explicit emphasis on the unanimity principle for CFSP decisions and the leading role of the member states to implement them as well as the reminder of the limited roles of the European Commission and the European Parliament and the exclusion of the European Court of Justice.<sup>33</sup> In a more pessimist view one might, however, conclude that the future “mere” “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” would appear as the weaker player compared to the future President of the European Council with whom he/ she will compete to a certain degree anyway. Of course, much will depend on the persons nominated for these new positions and how they will interpret their roles definitions in daily practice.

Another important factor which will impact upon the real performance of the respective roles of those key actors is the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Already foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty and reaffirmed in the Lisbon Treaty<sup>34</sup> as a means to assist the then Union Foreign Minister in his/ her in fact challenging responsibilities the concrete format of this service has remained unclear so far. Earlier discussions in the aftermath of the Constitutional Treaty had revealed considerable divergences among the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament about the details of the service.<sup>35</sup> Even though it was decided at the Lisbon summit in December 2007 to relaunch the debate already during the ratification procedure<sup>36</sup> very little seems to have been done since then. The negative vote of the Irish people in 2008 has brought all further considerations about an early implementation and a further precision of other open questions - such as the Union’s delegations abroad which will fall under the responsibility of the new foreign policy chief and which need also further clarifications in particular in what will be their relationship to the diplomatic missions of the member states and the established practices for consultation and chairmanship “at place”- to a sudden halt.

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<sup>31</sup> See Art. 28e/ 46 Lisbon Treaty/ TEU and the respective protocol.

<sup>32</sup> Regelsberger, E., Von Nizza nach Lissabon – das neue konstitutionelle Angebot für die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU, in: *integration* No.3, 2008..

<sup>33</sup> See in particular Art.11/ 24 Lisbon Treaty/ TEU and the respective declarations (Nos. 13 and 14) adopted by the IGC: Final Act CIG 15/07.

<sup>34</sup> Art. 13a/ 27 Lisbon Treaty/ TEU and Declaration No.15 Final Act.

<sup>35</sup> The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy, EPC Working Paper No. 28, Brussels 2007.

<sup>36</sup> See Declaration No. 15 Final Act.

It seems as if the prospects for another Irish referendum to be held in autumn 2009 and based on the decisions of the June European Council<sup>37</sup> might bring those open questions to the fore again. Provided the Lisbon Treaty will come into force later this year it will be upon the Swedish and even more so on the Spanish Presidency in the first semester of 2010 to prepare the modalities<sup>38</sup> for a smooth transition from the present to the new institutional set-up ( i.e. end of presidency system and rotation in European Council and External Relations Council) – presumably a highly challenging task!

### **Italian- German interests in CFSP**

Traditionally Italy and Germany belong to the protagonists of a strong European “voice” in international affairs. In line with an overall pro-European approach of the governments in Rome and Berlin far-reaching proposals on EU foreign policy reforms have been developed and received the support of the other side. This was the case notably under the Italian Presidency in 2003 which brought the Intergovernmental Conference at that time to an end and later on during the German EU Presidency in 2007 which had to pave the way towards the Lisbon Treaty and mediate between those- like Italy - who wanted to safeguard as much of the contents of the Constitutional Treaty and those – like e.g. the UK, Poland - who wished to introduce limitations to the provisions agreed upon earlier on.

Also in daily CFSP business insiders<sup>39</sup> underline that Italian and German interests converge to a large degree and would not support the view of certain outsiders who tend to see a “slow alienation” between the two partners. If one is to believe official sources there is hardly any other partner among the 27 who shares so many positions of the other. However, does this proximity in substance produce some sort of a strong and durable coalition among the 27 and facilitate decision-making inside the CFSP? From outside and particularly from a German perspective it seems as if other partners and in particular the country holding the CFSP Presidency is the first to address next to the privileged concertation between Berlin, Paris and London. Italy in contrast remains concerned to any kind of smaller circles among the 27 and of the “Big Three” in particular. The EU-3 formula towards Iran is a meanwhile accepted one but its application to other issues as some sort of a model<sup>40</sup> is viewed with scepticism particularly on the part of the smaller EU partners.

### **Issues to be raised in Torino debate**

- The CFSP output in retrospect – ever widening and deepening

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<sup>37</sup> See Presidency Conclusions, European Council Brussels, 18/19 June 2009.

<sup>38</sup> See Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 11/12 December 2008, Brussels, Doc.17271/1/08 REV 1.

<sup>39</sup> See the speech of German Foreign Minister Steinmeier during the German – Italian Forum , 20 April 2009, Berlin.

<sup>40</sup> Discussed in academic circles earlier on: See: B. Giegerich: E 3 Leadership in Security and Defence Policy, in: CFSP Forum, vol.4, no.6, 2006, pp.5-7.

- Where , when and for whom does CFSP matter most
  - \* for external conflict prevention and crisis management – regional proximity
  - \* for the EU - internal cohesion i.e. among the 27 and/ or the horizontal dimension Council/ Commission
  - \* for the individual member states – the big, the small, the old, the young

The impact of previous EU enlargement on CFSP procedures and substance

Waiting for the Lisbon Treaty – the value of the new provisions, timing and open institutional questions

Italy and Germany – “natural” partners in CFSP